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Judicial cognition in brief. 
The judicial scene after amendments 
to the Code of Criminal Procedure
Introduction
This paper does not claim to be an in-depth analysis of the issues relat-
ed to the cognitive process in the criminal trial. However, it is a voice 
in the discussion on the amendments to the criminal procedure law 
introduced as of 1 July 2015.
The amendments entail a major ‘remodelling’ of the criminal trial 
and as such deserve to be given thought, in particular to its cognitive 
aspect. The study of the acts amending the Code of Criminal Procedure1, 
and explanatory notes appended to them make it absolutely clear that 
the goal of the criminal trial is set to change. The court will no longer 
seek an answer to the question ‘What happened and how did it hap-
pen?’, but rather to the question whether the prosecutor, who bears the 
burden of proof in the formal sense, has proved that the defendant is 
guilty as charged. The search for the truth is thus defi ned diff erently in 
the new law of criminal procedure than it is in the regulation in force 
until 30 June 20152.
1 The Act of 27 IX 2013 on Amending the Code of Criminal Procedure and Some 
Other Acts (J.L. 2013, item 1247) and the Act of 20 II 2015 on Amending the Crimi-
nal Code and Some Other Acts (J.L. 2015, item 396); both Acts entered into force on 
1 July 2015 and amend the Code of Criminal Procedure of 6 VI 1997 (J.L. 1997 No. 89 
item 555 as amended), hereinafter “CCP”.
2 The fundamental principle of the forthcoming amendment of the law of criminal 
procedure is the heightening of the adversarial nature of that part of the criminal trial, 
which takes place before the court. The amendment has defi ned anew the duties of 
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In this connection, it becomes necessary to ask the question whether 
the model of judicial cognitive process, as described in Poznanie sądowe 
a poznanie naukowe (Judicial cognition and scientifi c cognition) by Ma-
ciej Zieliński3, is going to change. M. Zieliński’s work centres on simi-
larities and diff erences between two kinds of cognition: scientifi c and 
judicial. As the subject matter of cognition in a trial, the cited author 
considers specifi c fragments of reality (facts)4 and as the fact-fi nder, 
he considers these entities (persons or groups of persons) who are 
actually involved in the cognitive process or those who are expected 
(for instance, by reason of their being appointed for this purpose in 
one way or another) to participate in the cognitive process5. In this 
approach, both the court, as the determinative fact-fi nder6, and other 
persons or groups of persons, for instance, parties to the trial, are 
fact-fi nders.
The discussion on judicial cognition and the fi ndings arrived at by 
M. Zieliński are grounded upon the former Code of Criminal Proce-
dure7. The legislator at that time had other values, and other priorities 
and laid emphasis on altogether diff erent aspects of the judicial pro-
cess. Nonetheless, the model approach to judicial cognition taken by 
M. Zieliński is also now becoming a reference point in the discussions 
on plausible solutions and their assessments, which emerge from the 
current legislation as optimization models. The high citation frequency 
of M. Zieliński’s work in authoritative writings on criminal procedure 
is related to the fact that he developed a workable concept apparatus 
to describe major cognitive process components. Owing to this, the 
relevant judicial cognition issues can be revisited today, regardless of 
the fact that the law of criminal procedure has completely changed. As 
a result, an appropriate discourse of judicial reasoning can be conducted, 
employing concepts defi ned by M. Zieliński.
the court and parties with respect to evidence. Under the new legislation the power to 
introduce evidence is shared by adverse parties to the trial who are expected to produce 
evidence in support of their contentions and rely on it at trial. The court, maintaining in 
this tripartite trial arrangement the position of an independent umpire, has practically 
lost the right to hear evidence on its own initiative. 
3 M. Zieliński, Poznanie sądowe a poznanie naukowe, Poznań 1979.
4 Ibidem, p. 71.
5 Ibidem, p. 94.
6 A fact-fi nder whose fi ndings actually count in arriving at a decision.
7 Code of Criminal Procedure of 19 IV 1969 (J.L. 1969, No. 13, item 96 as amended).
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In the preliminaries to his study, M. Zieliński defi ned certain funda-
mental concepts such as the cognitive process framework, cognition 
subject matter and tasks, parties to the cognitive process (fact-fi nders) 
and cognitive directives. Due to the brevity of this paper, only some 
issues discussed by the cited author will be focused on. These, it will 
be argued, are of particular importance in motivating an analysis of the 
consequences for the model of judicial cognition after the acts amending 
the Code of Criminal Procedure enter into force.
1. In search of a model of judicial cognition
Formulating possible theoretical models of judicial cognition, M. Zie-
liński suggests that certain principles or models be taken into account, 
including especially those such as the accusatorial and adversarial 
principles, the principle of the discretionary exercise of their rights by 
the parties and the principle of truth. For it is on the position of these 
principles vis-à-vis one another and the force of each that the model 
of judicial cognition chosen by the legislator depends. It can therefore 
be a model in which the accusatorial principle is the kingpin or the 
adversary and party discretion principles come more or less to the fore, 
wherein the truth the cognitive process seeks is the formal truth (the 
more convincing argument wins) or the objective truth (the argument 
which is more consistent with the reality wins). Scrutinizing which 
principles and what degree of intensity the legislator encodes in the 
new provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code, one can easily see that 
judicial cognition in the criminal trial after 1 July 2015 will continue 
to be founded on the accusatorial principle. The principal accusatory 
pleading (it is no longer information only)8 gives an impulse to instigate 
jurisdiction proceedings and imposes on the court a duty to adjudicate 
on the case brought by a competent prosecutor. The limits within which 
the court is to hear a case, both with respect to persons and matters 
involved, are set by the prosecutor. It is he or she (albeit in a modifi ed 
formula) who sets the range of the judicial cognition of reality and the 
matter at issue to be tried by the prosecutor and defendant before the 
8 A motion by the prosecutor for a conditional discontinuance of proceedings and 
a motion for conviction under Art. 335 § 1 of the CCP (independent motion) are also 
principal accusatory pleadings.
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court. Here, in turn, a space for the adversarial principle opens. It has 
been mentioned so often that it has become the catchword for the 
changes being introduced into the criminal trial9. For this principle is to 
defi ne a new model of judicial proceedings in its normative and factual 
essence designed as a contest of two independent trial parties enjoying 
equal rights. Moreover, the crux of an adversarial system designed in 
this way is an almost complete diminution of the evidentiary initiative 
of the court. The principle of party discretion, which is not distinguished 
in the current criminal trial doctrine, is, however, noticeable as an ele-
ment of the adversarial system10 and in the emerging trial confi guration 
it acquires a great signifi cance. For the parties play a decisive role in 
the new model of judicial proceedings (within the meaning discussed 
here – judicial cognition, to be precise). It is they who collect and present 
evidence, and after it is admitted by the court, rely on it in the course of 
the trial. The court is supposed to remain passive in this confi guration. 
Its role is to assess evidence, i.e. to determine the logical value of some-
body else’s contentions. Can the court, as the determinative fact-fi nder, 
collect such a body of evidence that will enable it to fi nd a real answer 
to the question of which contentions by the parties to the trial are true? 
Or is it absolutely deprived of any power to shape the factual basis of 
its decision?
In this connection, the new model of judicial proceedings is – as are 
previous ones – founded on the principle of objective truth. This is seen 
above all in the provision providing that all decisions are to be based on 
true fi ndings of fact (Art. 2 § 2 of the CCP). This would preclude a belief 
that the legislator intends to deprive the court as being the determinative 
fact-fi nder of the possibility to search for appropriate cognitive sources. 
However, the truth the court is supposed to seek has less and less in 
common with the adequate cognition of a specifi c fragment of reality 
(searching for an answer to the question ‘What happened and how did 
it happen?’). It will no longer be about the search for the absolute truth, 
which is the explicit goal of the trial now, but the confi rmation of the 
thesis of the prosecution. In addition, such a confi rmation is not de-
fi ned as the goal of the trial but as a condition of holding the defendant 
9 See the explanatory notes to the bill to amend the Act – Criminal Procedure Code 
and some other Acts; https://bip.ms.gov.pl/pl/projekty-aktow-prawnych/prawo-karne 
(accessed: 5 VI 2015).
10 S. Waltoś, P. Hofmański, Proces karny. Zarys systemu, Warszawa 2013, p. 285.
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criminally responsible11. The activity of the trial parties in the search 
for evidence and their reliance on it in court has been modifi ed; but 
the court has been left a limited possibility of obtaining evidence inde-
pendently (that is on its own initiative) in exceptional cases justifi ed 
by special circumstances12.
Thus it appears that after 1 July 2015, the normative model of judicial 
cognition in criminal matters, as reconstructed from the relevant leg-
islation, can be described as founded on the principles of accusatorial, 
adversarial and objective truth, imposing duties on the parties with 
respect to the collection and use of evidence, and subjecting the court 
to restrictions as far as evidence initiative is concerned. Furthermore, 
the model enjoins the subjects of cognition (fact-fi nders) to make 
true fi ndings of fact which ought to underpin all trial decisions. In 
the model thus defi ned by statute, the subject matter of cognition is 
a fragment of reality, with its confi nes being set in actual fact by both 
trial parties and not only by the prosecutor. Admittedly, it is the ac-
cusatory pleading that sets the limits of controversy, but both parties 
are responsible for supplying evidence (albeit either exculpatory or 
inculpatory, depending on the division of trial roles) and relying on 
it before the court.
Is therefore the new model of jurisdiction proceedings (as the spon-
sors of the bills see it) at the same time a new (in the sense of being 
diff erent from the existing one) model of judicial cognition? A cogni-
tive process calls for performing certain acts in order to come to know 
certain facts. Such acts include the adoption of a specifi c conception 
of the cognitive process (e.g. choice of a specifi c tactic), accumulation 
of material to be examined, preparation of this material (both critically 
and technically) and formulation of specifi c conclusions (intermediate 
and ultimate)13. Undoubtedly, in judicial cognition, the court is both 
a fact-fi nder and a determinative fact-fi nder. It is understood as a court 
having jurisdiction or, even more specifi cally, the bench of this court ap-
pointed to hear a given case. It is bound to explain the matter and enter 
a judgment. Hence, only cognition performed by a body designated as 
11 P. Hofmański, Zasada prawdy w postulowanym modelu procesu karnego, in: Pojęcie, 
miejsce i znaczenie prawdy w polskim procesie karnym, red. J. Skorupka, K. Kremens, Wro-
cław 2013, p. 47.
12 See Art. 167 § 1 of the CCP.
13 See M. Zieliński, op. cit., p. 94.
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a determinative fact-fi nder and as such appointed to perform cognitive 
acts may matter legally, that is, may enjoy appropriate legal relevance. 
Can other entities, in particular trial parties, together with the court, next 
to it, or even independently of it, conduct a cognitive process in respect 
of the same facts and in a legally binding manner? To a similarly framed 
question, however in a diff erent normative reality, M. Zieliński answers 
in the negative. Although he recognizes trial parties (in a methodolog-
ical sense) as ‘forced’14 cognitive helpers of the court or the determina-
tive fact-fi nder, he does not confer on them the role of determinative 
fact-fi nders in the sense that their cognition is neither independent nor 
legally relevant (binding). He does, however, notice the important role 
of trial parties in the area of conceptions and inferences15.
Will the role of trial parties in the new normative reality change? 
Taking over the competences to guide cognition (after all this is the 
essence of cognition in a given case, is it not?), will they keep the role 
of cognitive facilitators or will they become themselves determinative 
fact-fi nders? These questions are posed not only because the wording 
of some provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure has changed. 
These questions arise above all from the explanatory notes appended 
to the proposed changes by the legislator. It follows from them clearly 
that the court will not help trial parties in collecting evidence, bearing 
out the claims of the prosecution or arguing against them. The author-
itative literature on criminal procedure makes a distinction between 
the concepts of relying on a piece of evidence at trial and conducting 
evidentiary proceedings; the latter concept, being broader, is held to 
cover discovery, collection, preservation and revelation of evidence in 
a formalized way (defi ned in the provisions of procedural law), as well 
as the assessment of such evidence16. The crucial provision that has 
been amended is Art. 167 of the CCP. It not only settles the question 
now of who enjoys the so-called evidentiary initiative in a criminal 
trial, but also regulates the question of reliance on evidence. Specif-
ically, it imposes the burden of active participation in the process of 
proving on a participant in the trial, depending on whether the trial 
14 That is imposed on the court by the legislator if only by the range of duties assigned 
to them in the process of proving and the necessity to take into account their activity, e.g. 
dismissing an evidentiary motion fi led by a party requires to give reasons, a mishandling 
of evidence may form grounds for appeal as a breach of procedural law, etc.
15 See M. Zieliński, op. cit., p. 107 et seq.
16 R. Kmiecik, E. Skrętowicz, Proces karny. Część ogólna, Kraków–Lublin 1999, p. 282.
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was commenced on the initiative of one of the parties, or not. Fur-
thermore, a possibility has arisen for the parties to introduce so-called 
‘private evidence’ or materials that are produced outside of the trial by 
the parties themselves, another trial participant or even by a person 
who does not appear at the trial17. The court, however, admits such 
evidence fi rst and uses it (relies on it) – in accordance with its char-
acter – afterwards.
It is also assumed that evidentiary initiative and activity burden the 
parties in all judicial proceedings instituted on the initiative of a trial 
party. This applies to proceedings instituted by an accusation (public, 
auxiliary or private) and appellate proceedings as well as any and all 
interlocutory proceedings commenced by the motion of a party. Under 
the new CCP (Art. 167) evidentiary activity is the responsibility of 
both parties to the trial and not only of the party instituting it (pros-
ecutor). The explanatory notes mentioned earlier maintain that the 
material burden of proof will weigh on the defendant more heavily 
than previously. However, the decision to introduce evidence to the 
trial (admit it at the jurisdictional stage) will continue to rest with the 
court (also with the president of the court or the presiding judge – de-
pending on the phase of this stage of the trial). It is rather exceptional 
but admissible for the court to rely on a piece of evidence when the 
party which has fi led a motion to admit the evidence fails to appear 
at the hearing. Then, the court must confi ne its use of the evidence to 
the point it is meant to prove as indicated in the evidentiary motion; 
otherwise, the court may use evidence on its own initiative only in 
exceptional circumstances.
Nowhere in the new provision and its entire normative ‘context’ 
can one fi nd a hint of how the term ‘relying on evidence’ used in it is 
to be construed. For it appears that the term has acquired a diff erent 
sense and is now to be used for the active participation of the parties in 
judicial proceedings. For there is nothing to indicate that the legislator 
indeed intends to entrust the parties with the conduct of evidentiary 
proceedings, even less so with the process of forming the factual basis 
of a decision (judicial cognition). One therefore has to concur with 
the opinion that the reliance on evidence at trial requires that a trial 
organ (here: the court) not be just a detached and passive observer of 
the use of evidence, but stay in the centre of this act and participate 
17 See Art. 393 § 3 of the CCP.
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in it actively18. The court must also adjust the manner of how the evi-
dence is to be relied on at trial to the source and kind of evidence, and 
to come into direct contact with it19. Even if the trial parties infl uence 
the formation of a cognitive conception, as well as its possible modi-
fi cations with their evidentiary motions and arguments, the direction 
of cognition stays within the competence of the court. Similarly, the 
parties may – with respect to inference – infl uence what conclusions 
are drawn from the source material and may (or it seems even that 
they have to), in accordance with their trial functions, subject it to 
criticism. This is after all what their trial dispute (discussion) is in part 
about and, presumably, also what the legislator expects, making the 
trial more adversarial.
2. Discussion and its signifi cance
An interesting thread running through the discussion of a judicial cogni-
tion model, the discussion between fact-fi nders, is understood as a kind 
of confrontation of opposing contentions (assertions and arguments by 
one trial party inconsistent with assertions and arguments by the oppo-
site trial party). Each trial party strives to have its contention considered 
legitimate. The discussion pending between the criminal trial parties is 
an important factor, facilitating cognition for the court as the determina-
tive fact-fi nder. Studying this question, M. Zieliński sees a connection 
between the cognitive process and the holding of a discussion20 or, more 
precisely, taking advantage by the court of the results of a discussion 
pending between the trial parties and of its relation to the court’s own 
cognitive activity. The cited author notes that if the cognitive process 
is reduced to the determinative fact-fi nder (court) availing itself only of 
the results of somebody else’s discussion, then the fact-fi nder as such 
will not perform any cognitive acts, but will concentrate all its eff ort on 
fi nding which of the arguing parties formulated legitimate contentions 
18 M. Klejnowska, Przeprowadzanie dowodów w procesie karnym w świetle nowelizacji 
Kodeksu postępowania karnego z 27 września 2013 r., in: Postępowanie dowodowe w świetle 
nowelizacji Kodeksu postępowania karnego, red. A. Lach, A. Bułat, Toruń 2014, p. 22.
19 Admissible ‘indirect’ reliance on evidence at trial does not mean anything else 
but a diff erent ‘indirect’ manner of evidence perception, e.g. reading out the transcript 
of a witness testimony and not interviewing a witness in person.
20 In connection with the broadly understood organization of a cognitive process, 
which he treats as an important structural element of judicial cognition.
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(who ‘won’) and will accept these very contentions. Making the new 
model of a criminal trial adversarial might suggest that the model of 
judicial cognition discussed above has indeed been adopted. However, 
leaving a possibility for the court to conduct evidentiary proceedings 
on its own initiative in exceptional cases under special circumstances 
shows that the court is given an opportunity to pursue its own cognitive 
activity (albeit exceptionally). We do not witness here only a ‘passive’ 
use of the results of somebody else’s discussion (by accepting the con-
tentions of the party who has cited more persuasive arguments than the 
opposing party). The court is supposed to be active, not only through 
its own cognitive activity, but also by drawing support from the dis-
cussion between trial parties if only on heuristic ideas or ways to reach 
new cognition sources (e.g. by granting the evidentiary motions of the 
parties – ‘admitting evidence’).
In this respect, the issues related to the trend towards consensual 
decision-making look interesting; the more so as it has already gained 
much ground in Polish criminal procedure law. For it appears that the 
current model of judicial cognition can be aptly described by making 
a distinction between its two versions: one found in a confrontational 
and the other in a consensual trial. The former designates this trend in 
the cognitive process in which opposing arguments of the trial parties 
clash (under the rules of the adversarial system) and where the court as 
the determinative fact-fi nder assesses the arguments and assertions con-
cerning the examined fragment of reality, being off ered by the opposing 
trial parties. This trend (and at the same time a model of judicial cogni-
tion) is at work at a hearing. In the consensual trend, in turn, the model 
of judicial cognition assumes an entirely diff erent aspect? The court still 
remains a determinative fact-fi nder, but the cognitive process is limited 
to the court’s learning the contentions by the trial parties concerning 
the fragment of reality indicated by them. This view is supported by the 
provisions underlying the conviction of the defendant to the punish-
ment or penal measure agreed with the prosecutor when the defendant 
pleads guilty21 or – without the need of express admission – agrees to 
the conviction22 or petitions to be so convicted23. In such situations, prior 
to entering a judgment (which happens outside of a hearing, at a special 
sentencing sitting), the court does not conduct evidentiary proceedings 
21 Art. 335 § 1 of the CCP.
22 Art. 335 § 2 of the CCP.
23 Art. 338a of the CCP.
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but accepts factual assertions proff ered by the parties. From the point of 
view of the role of discussion in judicial cognition, in this case we are faced 
with a type of judicial cognition which consists in a passive acceptance of 
the fi ndings of fact (assertions on a given fragment of reality) originating 
with both parties, their joint ones so to speak, as grounds for a decision. 
The conduct of the trial parties in each cognition trend is thus completely 
diff erent. Signifi cantly, in the consensual trend, one can hardly fi nd any 
discussion between the trial parties, which is after all the essence of the 
adversarial system. On what is then the court, rendering a decision, sup-
posed to base its conviction about the truth of the facts presented by the 
parties? Indeed, it does not even avail itself of the discussion between the 
trial parties. The trend of consensual decision-making, so considerably 
strengthened in the new criminal trial, relies in fact not on the results of 
cognition but rather on the consensus of the parties forming its essence. 
This, in turn, is no longer concerned solely with the sentence, but also 
with the circumstances of the commission of the off ence, hence, with 
assertions about a certain fragment of reality.
Referring to M. Zieliński’s fi ndings, one can see that in judicial cog-
nition, which is a set of conventional acts performed by competent per-
sons or groups of persons and in accordance with a specifi c procedure, 
the terms ‘legitimate assertion’ and ‘true assertion’ are not one and the 
same. The former means the same as “an assertion which is obligato-
rily included among assertions forming the fi ndings of fact on which 
the judgment is based”24 (trans. – H.P.). In judicial proceedings, a fact 
described in a legitimate assertion will be considered as subsisting and 
will be included in the factual grounds of the judgment. It appears that 
this is the situation one will be faced with once the amendments under 
discussion enter into force.
3. Cognition and explanation of facts
The change of the paradigm of adjudicating in criminal matters, al-
ready noted in the literature25, forces a question about the truth of the 
event upon which criminal responsibility of the accused is determined. 
24 M. Zieliński, op. cit., p. 196.
25 P. Hofmański, S. Waltoś, Tendencje rozwoju polskiego procesu karnego. Proces karny 
w XXI wieku, in: System prawa karnego procesowego, t. 1, cz. 1, red. P. Hofmański, Warszawa 
2013, p. 400 et seq.
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There is an ongoing discussion in the doctrine of criminal law, inspired, 
among other things by the recent amendments to the law of criminal 
procedure, whether the principle of objective truth will, or should, be 
the most important principle in the normative model of a criminal trial.
If one adopts, after M. Zieliński, a view that the judicial cognition 
model introduces a peculiar and complex conventional paradigm of 
the validity of statements, taking into account normative, methodolog-
ical and axiological elements26, it will become clear that the new model 
of reformatory adjudication in a criminal trial makes no unambiguous 
reference to the requirement of fi nding the truth, satisfying itself with 
substitutes of truth. However, it seems that in the legislator’s opinion the 
new solution that fi rmly sets in and expands on the trend of consensual 
adjudication is indeed a way of arriving at a judicial truth, albeit as its 
concept in the understanding of M. Zieliński and J. Wróblewski27, rather 
than as understood by the representatives of the doctrine of the law of 
criminal procedure. Until now, Art. 2 § 1 para. 1 of the CCP has been 
rather uniformly construed, and its provisions have been understood as 
intending to shape the criminal proceedings in a way enabling to detect 
and convict the perpetrator and save the innocent from accountability; 
while Art. 2 § 2 of the same Code has been interpreted as obliging the 
parties to a trial to pursue to achieve the above state of art28, so that all 
decisions delivered in a criminal trial be based on factual fact fi ndings. 
Also the Constitutional Court (Trybunał Konstytucyjny) supports such 
interpretation of the principle, recognizing it as an element of the right 
to trial (Art. 45 of the Constitution)29. However, opinions expressed in 
the context of the recent amendments being made to the law of criminal 
procedure, articulate an opinion that Art. 2 § 2 of the CCP does not call 
for the objective truth but the judicial truth30, which in a certain way ap-
proximates the two rather distant views. This is because if one agrees that 
26 M. Zieliński, op. cit., p. 197.
27 Ibidem; who quotes J. Wróblewski, Z zagadnień prawdy sądowej, “Studia Krymino-
logiczne, Kryminalistyczne i Penitencjarne” 1975, t. 2, p. 23.
28 The expressions „should” was used here within the meaning of a duty of the trial 
organs to take measures leading to discover facts corresponding to what really happened. 
Cf. A. Murzynowski, Istota i zasady procesu karnego, Warszawa 1994, p. 113 et seq.
29 Cf. B. Nita, A. Światłowski, Kontradyktoryjny proces karny (między prawdą materialną 
a szybkością postępowania, “Państwo i Prawo” 2012, z. 1, p. 36 et seq.; The Constitution of 
the Republic of Poland of 2 IV 1997 (J.L. 1997 No. 78, item 483 as amended).
30 See P.  Kardas, Projektowany model obrony z  urzędu a  zasada prawdy materialnej, 
“Palestra” 2013, nr 5–6, p. 20.
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what is being sought in a criminal trial is judicial truth established based 
on the application of a conventional system of evidentiary rules by which 
the court as a determinative fact-fi nder as well as the parties to the trail 
are bound, one will clearly see that this judicial truth, till date identifi ed 
with formal truth (opposite to objective truth) is in fact nothing else but 
the truth, the establishment (detection) of which provides the court with 
grounds for adjudication. It may also be worthy a note that the principle 
of objective truth extends on reformatory adjudication as well as formal 
adjudication, and does not reduce the requirement of fi nding facts to serve 
as grounds for adjudication to the sentencing only (since the fi nding of 
facts is also required in the case of “any” decision, ruling or disposition).
On the theoretical plane, there exists a view that the above perception 
of judicial truth is not in contradiction to the possibility of implementing 
the objective truth principle. The latter is understood by the theorists of 
law as an order addressed to the bodies which apply law, obliging them 
to exercise due diligence to fi nd facts that will be corresponding with the 
truth31. Although these deliberations are focused on judicial cognition, 
i.e. a proceeding at the jurisdictional stage that constitutes the central 
and basic element of the cognitive activity performed by judiciary bod-
ies32 (which is at the same time the ultimate and binding cognition), in 
the new model of a criminal trial, actions leading to cognition will also 
be taken by organs which conduct preparatory proceedings, who, based 
on the results determined will decide whether to lodge a complaint (and 
if so, which one), and thus initiate the cognitive activity (stage), or not33. 
Irrespective of which complaint will initiate the proceedings before 
court, though, the very judicial cognition cannot be a copy, or repetition 
of the way already made by the prosecution (or the reconstruction of 
the cognition process carried out during the preparatory proceeding)34. 
31 S. Wronkowska, M. Zieliński, Z. Ziembiński, Zasady prawa. Zagadnienia podstawowe, 
Warszawa 1974, p. 179.
32 M. Zieliński, op. cit., s. 19.
33 Art. 297 § 1 para. 5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure determines new tasks to be 
undertaken by the organs conducting preparatory proceedings such as collection and 
preservation of evidence in a durable form. This can be related to judicial cognition 
insomuch that the durable form of evidence will be capable of being used indirectly 
(by reading out protocols) to confi rm the grounds for a claim or complaint or to discon-
tinue proceedings, as well as to put forward a motion requesting permission to use the 
collected evidence for presentation in the court.
34 A totally diff erent issue is a possibility of discovering, collecting and putting eviden-
ce into durable form in the course of preparatory proceedings, which should be related 
to judicial cognition insomuch as the evidence in durable form and such evidence may 
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This is not only because courts are independent bodies in fact fi nding, 
but results from the new contradictory (adversarial) model of the main 
trial provided for in Art. 167 of the CCP.
Thus, passing on to the contradictory, or adversarial manner of cogni-
tion in criminal law (the symbolism of which is a new content of Art. 167 
of the CCP), the distinctness of this model in relation to the consensual 
reformatory adjudication must be emphasized. This distinctiveness is 
not only the eff ect of participation in the trial parties acting as entities 
participating in the judicial cognition, who take over the evidentiary 
initiative, or the changed position of the court which is now to act as 
an independent arbitrator resolving the dispute between the parties. 
The change of the paradigm is connected among other things with the 
change in the access to information on facts and a new approach to 
the requirement of directness in the evidentiary proceedings.
4. Resource basis and its limitations
Describing the judicial cognition process, M. Zieliński drew attention to 
the determination and explanation of facts as an element of the process. 
Among the detailed cognition directives which he formulated, those 
especially noteworthy in the context of the amendments to the law of 
criminal procedure are directives referring to the building of a ‘source 
base’ i.e. the set of sources from which information about facts of our 
interest can be obtained35.
Firstly, what needs to be noted is a statutory restriction of the acces-
sibility of certain sources of cognition, i.e. the possibility of accessing 
them in the criminal trial. A few words of explanation are necessary 
here due to the amendments which the legislator has introduced in the 
criminal proceeding. First, however, it is worthwhile to recall that in ju-
dicial cognition, a dynamic access to the source36 is overridden by a tetic 
possibility arising from the existence of binding legal norms which may 
eliminate some of the available sources with information on facts. This 
was emphasised by M. Zieliński who stated that “a legislator has a legally 
binding possibility of eliminating certain sources of cognition, even 
subsequently be indirectly used (by reading out the protocol) for the building of a basis 
for the adjudication in the matter by court.
35 M. Zieliński, op. cit., p. 175 et seq.
36 The author understands by that the accessibility to sources.
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those available […] from the set constituting someone’s source base, 
also having no account for them in such a manner that having taken 
them into consideration might entail an accusation formulated by the 
audit bodies and consequently lead to setting aside a judicial decision 
whose actual state has been established, among other things, based on 
inadmissible cognition sources”37 (trans. – H.P.).
Regarding the restrictions in the use of the source base, a new regu-
lation should be noted, inserted to the Code of Criminal Procedure as 
an amendment of September 2013, namely Art. 168a of the CCP which 
provides a list of sources of information about facts that are not allowed. 
The normative approach to this prohibition is not perfect, which means 
that it will create doubts when it comes to practice, however, reading 
its literally one notices that a peculiarly approached prohibition has 
been introduced, regarding evidence obtained unlawfully, or more 
specifi cally, through the use of a prohibited act. The signifi cance of 
this specifi c directive which shapes the process of judicial cognition 
is quite considerable. Its provision applies equally to the counsel for 
the defence, the suspect, the accused, the attorney of the accused, the 
prosecutor, as well as all other public organs performing whichever 
acts related to the trial as well as those outside the trial, i.e. acts which 
consist in an operational activity (cognitive activity) aimed at obtaining 
evidence38. A change in the model of court proceeding and moving, in 
line with the contradictory trend, of the process of building the actual 
basis for adjudication into the hands of the trial parties means that 
those parties will be able to obtain and present to court information 
about facts (evidence) originating from diff erent sources. However, 
where such evidence has been unlawfully obtained, it will be rendered 
inadmissible, and be eliminated as the court is not allowed to make 
use of such evidence. The regulation of Art. 168a of the CCP does not 
provide by statute for the prohibition of undertaking unlawful meas-
ures aimed at obtaining evidence needed in a trial process, but merely 
provides that such measures or actions taken are, by operation of the 
law ineff ective as the evidence obtained through their application will 
be inadmissible and impossible to be used in the trial. It is also worth 
noting that this provision applies to both sides (parties), i.e. also the 
37 Ibidem, p. 176.
38 Cf. P. Kardas, Głos w dyskusji. Konferencja: Rola i zadania prokuratora w znowelizowanej 
procedurze karnej. Panel II Wpływ kontradyktoryjnego modelu rozprawy głównej na postępowanie 
przygotowawcze, “Prokuratura i Prawo” 2015, nr 1–2, p. 226.
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public prosecutor who, when collecting evidence for its presentation in 
court will also be obliged to use only that, obtained “legally”. Another 
problem connected with the ‘source’ base, important for the process 
of its creation, is the regulation regarding the possibility of indirect 
recognition of fact. It should be explained here that in a criminal trial 
this is not about the possibility of using in the cognition process of 
indirect evidence (i.e. prima facie evidence) but about the method of 
evidencing as described in the doctrine of criminal law with the use of 
the principle of directness39.
The principle of directness, despite the lack of a clear statutory defi -
nition has been and still is (also after the amendments to the CCP) seen 
as a principle shaping the evidentiary process in a criminal proceeding. 
An important element serving to describe this principle is a reference to 
its limitations rather than contents. This is a characteristic and, indeed 
traditional for Polish literature, approach to the principle of directness 
which is identifi ed and described by pointing to its limitations.
It is understandable that while selecting a model of a criminal pro-
cess and shaping the normative model of judicial cognition, the leg-
islator did not adopt the principle of directness for the conducting of 
the evidencing process. It would not be justifi ed to create the basis for 
adjudication by determination of facts obtained thanks to derivative 
proof. It would also be doubtful to attempt to reach the truth based on 
such methods of evidencing which do not foresee a direct contact of 
a given organ with the source of proof, or which prefer some other in-
direct links between the trial (process) organ and the fact being proved. 
This, however, does not mean that in the shaping of a model of criminal 
proceeding, solutions that constitute a justifi ed derogation from direct-
ness understood as an obligation to make use of primary evidence and 
to eliminate all indirect links in the process of creating the evidentiary 
basis for adjudication cannot be employed.
Already at the time when the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1928 was 
binding as well as during the time when the Code of Criminal Procedure 
of 1969 was in force, derogations from the principle of directness were 
foreseen. The reasons that underlay this principle varied at diff erent 
times when individual respective acts governing that principle applied, 
but in each case the dominating rule was that derogation was possible 
39 H. Paluszkiewicz, Zasada bezpośredniości, in: System Prawa Karnego Procesowego, t. 3, 
cz. 2, red. P. Hofmański, Warszawa 2013, p. 1005–1119.
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or allowable only in strictly determined events and only where primary 
evidence was non existent or not available for the court as a fact-fi nder. 
The circumstances that are today identifi ed as limiting the principle of 
directness40, are being currently supplemented also with circumstances 
relating to the new model of cognition of criminal matters (here referred 
to as the consensual trend of adjudication). Thus in the new model of 
an evidentiary proceeding conducted in the confrontational, adversarial 
manner as outlined in Art. 167 of the CCP and the new wording of Ar-
ticles 389, 391, 393 and 394 of the CCP, the directives on the collecting 
as well as using the source base acquire a new meaning. What is worth 
mentioning here is a considerable weakening in the new model of the 
directive of judicial cognition postulating the use of primary information 
only (understood by M. Zieliński as a directive requesting exclusion 
from the data base of the secondary empirical information or, at least, 
securing priority to the primary information. The limitation of the prin-
ciple of directness, on grounds of diff erent circumstances including the 
non-articulated improvement or simplifi cation of the criminal process 
(trial) has become, in the new normative model of judicial cognition, 
a binding directive.
5. Justifi cation of statements of facts
Finally, one more issue needs to be added. Its importance has already 
been stressed by M. Zieliński when he wrote about the directives deter-
mining the justifi cation of the statements of the facts. Judicial cognition, 
as well as scientifi c cognition, is connected with a duty and a defi ned need 
to substantiate statements made in the process of cognition. What is im-
portant here is the intra-subjective communication and control(ability)
of statements (the knowledge acquired) and the subject involved in ju-
dicial cognition41. This extraordinarily interesting and complex problem 
will only be signalled here, and only in connection with the change in 
40 These are circumstances such as: disposing of evidence which by its very nature 
is derivative (e.g. an opinion of an independent expert), or in an event of non-availabi-
lity of the primary evidence (e.g. the witness has passed away), or the impossibility of 
conducting an evidentiary process despite the fact that it exists (e.g. the witness does not 
remember), or the need to check or complete the evidence (e.g. there are inconsistencies 
in explanations), or an improvement of the criminal process, a need to protect a justifi ed 
interest of a given participant of the process.
41 M. Zieliński, op. cit., p. 130 et seq.
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the wording of Art. 424 § 1 of the CCP42. In the descriptive layer of that 
provision the change in it seems to be of little signifi cance. However, for 
the statutory model of judicial cognition whose structural element is the 
justifi ability of the statements formulated by the cognition organ, this 
change seems to be of signifi cant importance. Following M. Zieliński’s 
view43 that the rationale of a verdict covers not only the justifi cation of 
the statements adopted as elements, i.e. the factual grounds for adju-
dication (verdict) and arguments which, in the opinion of the court as 
a determinative fact-fi nder, speak for accepting those statements, but 
also arguments quashing all contradictory arguments and the explana-
tion of the legal grounds for the resolution of the matter, it must be noted 
that the obligation to provide reasons for the verdict does indeed mean 
formulation (making) and presentation of the justifi cation of statements 
considered (accepted) by the court true. This does not apply only to the 
basic factual statements constituting the ultimate basis for resolving the 
matter but equally, to all other statements, and in particular to those jus-
tifying the fi nal one (if that one was the subject of ‘evidencing’). Leaving 
aside the fact that the legislator foresees situations in which the court 
may be released from the obligation to provide reasons for the decision 
(verdict), it must be emphasised, in the context of the amended law, 
that the court is released from the obligation to provide full explanation 
(reasons) underlying its decision. Such a regulation was already adopt-
ed earlier with regards adjudicating in the consensual mode, where it 
allowed to reduce the reasons for a decision to merely explaining the 
legal grounds and the verdict arrived at. In the doctrine, such a solution 
is regarded reasonable because a verdict in a consensual version is 
achieved as a result of a consensus reached with the accused. However, 
although the court is not, as a determinative fact-fi nder, released from 
the obligation to conduct a cognition process in any of the versions of 
reformatory adjudicating44, as provided in directives applicable to it, it 
still may, as can be seen, signifi cantly limit the extent of the justifi cation 
of its statements. What the legislator requires, is that the reasons stated 
are concise. Such formulation of the requirement (concise) considered 
42 Art. 424 of the CCP has been amended by the Act of 28 November 2014 on the 
protection and assistance to the victim and the witness (J.L. 2015, item 21) in force as 
of 8 April 2015.
43 M. Zieliński, op. cit., p. 135 et seq.
44 Even in the consensual mode of adjudicating the court comes across, to a limited 
extent, evidence presented by the parties.
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as a kind of a general clause45 creates some doubts whether the postulate 
of intersubjective communicativeness and controllability of statements 
upon which the verdict has been made (and this postulate is an intrinsic 
element of judicial cognition) has been satisfi ed46.
Conclusions
M. Zieliński’s work Poznanie sądowe a poznanie naukowe is an ordered 
entirety. In an ideally methodological manner, the author leads the 
reader through the complexity of the matter analysed, pointing out to 
similarities, but fi rst and foremost identifying the diff erences between 
judicial and scientifi c cognition. The deliberations presented in this 
paper, for which Zieliński’s work was an obvious inspiration and point 
of reference, were not conducted in a manner compatible to M. Zie-
liński’s conception of reasoning. The reason for that was not only the 
intended character of this paper, but also the desire to highlight in it only 
those new solutions introduced to the Polish law of criminal procedure, 
which, as an element of a broadly understood judicial cognition, may 
be supported by, or at least referred to, some of the theses formulated 
by M. Zieliński.
SZKIC O POZNANIU SĄDOWYM. KRAJOBRAZ PO NOWELIZACJI 
KODEKSU POSTĘPOWANIA KARNEGO
S t r e s z c z e n i e
Rozważania zawarte w artykule, inspirowane nowelizacją prawa karnego proceso-
wego, prowadzone są w nawiązaniu do ustaleń prof. Macieja Zielińskiego (Poznanie 
sądowe a poznanie naukowe, Poznań 1979). Odwzorowany z nowych przepisów 
model normatywny poznania sądowego w sprawach karnych, oparty na zasadzie 
skargowości, kontradyktoryjności i prawdy materialnej, akcentuje obowiązki stron 
w zakresie aktywności dowodowej i jednocześnie ogranicza sąd w zakresie inicja-
tywy dowodowej. Przedmiotem tego poznania jest fragment rzeczywistości, a jego 
45 For more see T. Zieliński, Klauzule generalne w procesie karnym, in: Zasady procesu 
karnego wobec wyzwań współczesności. Księga ku czci Profesora Stanisława Waltosia, red. 
J. Czapska i in., Warszawa 2000, p. 784.
46 The provision of Art. 424 of the CCP applies to other decisions as well, therefore 
the problem of a “concise” rationale seems of somewhat wider application, especially 
because Art. 425 § 2 of the CCP provides for a possibility of challenging the rationale 
of a given verdict.
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granice są wyznaczone przez obie strony procesowe (podmioty poznawcze), nie 
zaś jedynie przez oskarżyciela. Model poznania sądowego występuje w dwóch 
wersjach – w procesie konfrontacyjnym i konsensualnym. Pierwszy to nurt procesu 
poznawczego, w którym dochodzi (w ramach procesu kontradyktoryjnego, podczas 
rozprawy) do starcia się przeciwstawnych argumentacji stron procesowych. To mo-
del poznania sądowego, w którym sąd jako podmiot poznający ocenia argumenty 
i twierdzenia o badanym fragmencie rzeczywistości przedstawione przez obie strony 
postępowania. W nurcie konsensualnym sąd jest podmiotem poznającym, lecz 
proces poznawczy ograniczony jest do poznania przez sąd twierdzeń stron proce-
sowych, które dotyczą wskazanego przez nie fragmentu rzeczywistości. Jest to typ 
poznania sądowego polegający na biernym przyjęciu za podstawę rozstrzygnięcia 
ustaleń faktycznych (twierdzeń o danym wycinku rzeczywistości) pochodzących 
od obu stron (ich wspólnych). Nurt konsensualnego orzekania opiera się nie na 
wynikach poznania, lecz na stanowiącym jego istotę konsensusie stron dotyczącym 
rodzaju i wymiaru kary oraz okoliczności popełnienia czynu. W takim dominującym 
po nowelizacji modelu poznania sądowego fakt opisany w twierdzeniu zasadnym 
(co nie znaczy prawdziwym) będzie uznawany w postępowaniu sądowym za ist-
niejący i zostanie włączony do podstawy faktycznej wyroku.
Słowa kluczowe: poznanie sądowe w procesie karnym – model poznania sądowe-
go – podmiot poznawczy – proces konfrontacyjny – proces konsensualny
Studia Prawa Publicznego 2015-10 - 2 kor.indd   109 2016-01-18   09:38:49
